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THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE:
OBSERVATIONS IN REJOINDER
ROSCOE STEFFENt
MR. Whitney writes quite plausibly-by way of conclusion-that the Gov-
ernment's case:' against the investment bankers "simply evaporated,"2 when
it had to meet the statistical evidence introduced at the trial. He says that-
wholly unbeknownst to Government counsel-the industry was "revolution-
ized"3 after 1937. But, though that is an intriguing thought, there are two
points of law discussed earlier by Mr. Whitney which should first be dealt
with briefly: the nature of the "offenses" charged in the complaint, and the
distinction between "terms" and "means" in conspiracy pleading.
"Integrated Over-all Conspiracy"
It is stated flatly in my initial article that: "Of course, there is no 'con-
spiracy' known to the law-integrated, over-all or otherwise-which com-
prises both 'monopoly' and 'restraint of trade.' "' That was said as a basis
for the conclusion that Judge Medina committed manifest error, when he
decided the case before him on the assumption that only a single conglomerate
conspiracy had been charged.5 But, to Mr. Whitney, the writer's statement is
"patent error," to be disposed of in a footnote: "Innumerable cases have
recognized that the same conspiracy can 'comprise' both."0 In fact, he says
Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Griffith 7 "speaks of the defendants
having 'formed a conspiracy in violation of § 1 and § 2 of the Act.' "s
But surely Mr. Whitney can see that he is merely making a play on words,
for there is a plain difference between conspiracy, i.e., the acts done, and
conspiracy, i.e., the legal offense. The latter is a matter of statute, and even
a first reading of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 0 discloses that Congress
did not provide for one "integrated over-all conspiracy," but for two separate
offenses, with separate penalties for each.' 0 Nor did Mr. Justice Douglas say
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7. 334 U.S. 100,109 (1948).
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9. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
10. Perhaps Mr. Whitney is confused by such non-Sherman Act cases as McDonnell
v. United States, 19 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1927), where the court said: "That the indict-
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disregard significant evidence of common practices on the part of the defen-
anything to the contrary in the Griffith case, for most of his opinion is devoted
to a comparison of the two offenses-the conspiracy "in restraint of trade"
under section 1 of the Act, and the conspiracy "to monopolize" under section 2.
The sentence lifted out of context and relied on by Mr. Whitney meant simply
that the defendants had so conducted themselves as to have committed both
offenses, not that they were guilty of one conglomerate offense.1
Judge Medina's integration of the two offenses into one, moreover, was
clearly reversible error. The cases are many pointing out that there are im-
portant substantive differences between conspiracy in restraint of trade and
conspiracy to monopolize. Ordinarily, where monopoly is found, it is the "end
product" of restraint of trade,12 but, conversely, there are many conspiracies
in restraint of trade which do not involve monopoly. When Judge Medina
"integrated" the two charges into one offense, therefore, he improperly im-
posed a double burden on the Government. 13 It enabled him to lay aside and
dants, such as development~and use of the syndicate "system,"'1 4 the mainte-
ment charges in one count a conspiracy to commit two different offenses against the United
States [one under the Tariff Act of 1922 and the other under the National Prohibition
Act] does not make it bad for duplicity. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 ....
The charge of conspiracy to commit two offenses is a charge of only one offense, namely,
conspiracy." But the charge there, as the court pointed out, was brought under the gen-
eral "conspiracy statute," 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1940), now 62 SrAT. 701
(1948), 18 U.S.C. §371 (1952). See also Blum v. United States, 46 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1931). To have brought the Bankers' case under that statute-which clearly was not
done-would have involved the absurdity of charging defendants with having engaged in
a "conspiracy" to engage in a "conspiracy" to restrain trade. Besides, the Bankers' case
was a civil action, and the Govdrmnent is given no civil remedy in the antitrust field to
enforce § 371. Its authority, as granted by § 4, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 36 STAT.
1167 (1911), 15 U.SC. § 4 (1952), is "to prevent and restrain" violations of § 1 and § 2
of the Sherman Act, not violations of § 371 of the Criminal Code.
11. Even as a pleading matter, there was no basis for "integrating" the two charges.
As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 395
(1905), a "bill in equity is not to be read and construed as an indictment would have been
read and construed a hundred years ago, but it is to be taken to mean what It fairly
conveys to a dispassionate reader by a fairly exact use of English speech."
12. In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas said
a person "usually does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless he has acquired or main-
tained his strategic position, or sought to expand his monopoly, or expanded it by means
of those restraints of trade which are cognizable under § 1. For those things which are
condemned by § 2 are in large measure merely the end products of conduct which violated
§ 1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61. But this is not always true."
13. It meant that the Government had to prove not only an agreement to eliminate
price-competition and to channelize distribution, that is, the conspiracy to restrain trade,
but also that defendants had conspired to get "the cream of the business" for themselves,
that is, the conspiracy to monopolize. The case was presented, however, and argued on
summation, on the assumption that the court would, of course, pass on the restraint of
trade charge separate from the monopoly charges. This the court failed to do.
14. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Counsel for
one of the defendants stated to the court that his client worked out "the first syndicate
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nance of resale prices, and so on, simply by pointing out that other nondefen-
dant members of the industry engaged in similar practices. Plainly, the court
did not rule on the restraint of trade case charged in the complaint.
"Terms" and "Means"
So, with the conspiracy in restraint of trade being set on its own bottom,
so to speak, what are its "terms"? First, and most important, as briefly alleged
in paragraph 43 of the complaint-the charging paragraph-they consist of an
agreement on the part of the defendants to restrict, control, and fix "the chan-
nels and methods through which and the prices, terms, and conditions upon
which security issues are merchandised.. . ."'r, This was the central theme of
the conspiracy in restraint of trade.10 But in paragraph 44 additional sub-
sidiary "terms" are set out, together with some of the "means" by which the
conspiracy so outlined is alleged to have been carried out.
Mr. Whitney, however, would have it that paragraph 44 was little, if any-
thing, but a recital "of the very 'terms' of the conspiracy."' 7 This is a dis-
tortion of critical moment. Not that there is any magic in the words "terms"
or "means,"' 8 but the plaintiff has the burden of establishing agreement upon
the "terms" of a conspiracy.' 9 "Mfeans," on the other hand, are in a sense
but a description of some of the more significant evidence from which the court
may infer that an agreement existed on the "terms" alleged. One or more of
agreement that was entered into on a several basis," in the summer of 1934. Transcript of
Record, p. 7660, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Many other
substantially similar provisions are in common use among defendants. Typical are the
provisions as to the appointment of a manager, who is customarily given broad powers to
make group sales, to handle all selling group matters, to terminate or e.\tend the syndicate
(i.e., to end or continue price maintenance), to stabilize, to be paid a fee by the other under-
writers, and so on.
15. The full text is set out in Steffen, p. 172 n.21.
16. Mr. Whitney professes not to understand what is meant by a so-called "charging
paragraph,' unless it is labelled as such. Whitney, pp. 324-25. The "charging paragraph"
in an antitrust pleading is readily distinguished-without a label-by the fact that it is the
only paragraph which points out the provisions of the statute alleged to have been violated,
and states the nature of the claimed offenses. Everything to follow is amplification, care-
fully described as such, and not the statement of new and independent "charges" or
"offenses!'
17. Whitney, p. 325.
18. A variety of expressions has been used. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes used the words "scheme" and "elements": "The
scheme as a whole seems to us to be within reach of the law. The constituent elcmcnts,
as we have stated them, are enough to give the scheme a body and, for all that we can say,
to accomplish it." (Emphasis added.) Justice Lurton in United States v. Reading Co.,
226 U.S. 324, 344 (1912), spoke of the "combination" and the "steps" or "acts in further-
ance" of it.
19. The Government, of course, assumed this burden throughout. See, e.g., .Memoran-
dum on the Over-All Conspiracy, May 29, 1951, Transcript of Record, p. 7942, United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the "means" may not be proved at all; it is not necessary that each defendant
be shown to have employed any one or more of them.
20
The way paragraph 44 is articulated with the central charges stated in para-
graph 43, therefore, is a matter of importance. Mr. Whitney saw fit to quote
only the opening sentence of paragraph 44, which reads: "The conspiracy has
consisted of a continuing agreement and concert of action among the defen-
dants, the substantial terms of which have been that defendants: .... " 21 He then
informs the reader-as he did the court-that everything following is there-
fore really only a statement of "terms." In his view, it seems, there were no
"means" alleged in the complaint.
Unfortunately for Mr. Whitney's contention, the critical part of paragraph
44, which he failed to quote, continues in this way: "A. Agree not to compete
among themselves for and in the merchandising of security issues ... among
other means-(1) By employing the syndicate method," etc.22 It is only too
plain from this wording that paragraph 44A made it a further "term" of the
conspiracy charged generally in paragraph 43, that the defendants had agreed
"not to compete among themselves. '23 But, it is surely equally clear that sub-
20. In United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
Judge Rifkind said: "The crime is the conspiracy, Nash v. United States, 1913, 229 U.S.
373 .... The means do not qualify the charge of conspiracy, Jelke v. United States, 7 Cir.,
1918, 255 F. 264, and need not be proved as alleged, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 1.940, 310 U.S. 150, 250 ... ." Then, with reference to the facts of the case before
him, Judge Rifkind continued: "In other words, the indictment does not charge a violation
of law by reason of the annexation of restraints on competition as ancillaries to the sale
of a business but rather does charge the violation of law by reason of a principal agreement
or conspiracy unreasonably to restrain competition, executed by means of conveyances with
restrictive covenants annexed."
21. Whitney, p. 325.
22. The following is the full text:
"44. The conspiracy has consisted of a continuing agreement and concert of action
among the defendants, the substantial ternts of which have been that defendants:
"A. Agree not to compete among themselves for and in the merchandising of security
issues, and to divide among themselves, on a mutually satisfactory basis, the merchandis-
ing of the security issues obtained by each of the defendant banking firms from issuers,
among other means-
"(1) By employing the syndicate method to merchandise the security issues they handle.
"(2) By recognizing and deferring to the claims of the defendant traditional bankers
to manage and co-manage and control the merchandising of the securities of particular
issuers.
"(3) By determining their respective participations and positions in buying groups in
accordance with the concept of historical position.
"(4) By reciprocally exchanging participations in the buying groups which they manage.
"(5) By adopting, maintaining, and stabilizing uniform prices, terms, and conditions of
sale and resale for securities they merchandise to be adhered to by all participants in the
merchandising thereof." (Emphasis added.)
23. Other subsidiary terms were stated in subparagraphs 44B and 44C. Defendants
were alleged in 44B to have agreed "to eliminate the competition of other investment
bankers," and in 44C to have agreed "to prevent, restrain, minimize and discredit the use
of competitive bidding." The allegation in each case again was concluded with the words
[Vol. 64: 863
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paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, of paragraph 44A, relative to use of the
syndicate system, historical position, reciprocity and other practices, are simply
a statement of "means." 24 More words could not have made the point any
dearer.
Of such stuff, though, are decisions made.25 Observe what Mr. Whitney
can-and did--do with his point. Starting with the false premise that the
"means" alleged in paragraph 44A (1)-(5) were really "terms," he says it
was thus the Government's case "that the court should infer from the fact of
uniform adherence to such terms that they had been agreed upon."20 Of course,
this never was the Government's case.2 7 On the contrary, the court was asked
to look at all the various practices or "means" used by any one or all of the
defendants, not in order to infer that such practices had been agreed upon, but
to infer that defendants through their various activities were engaged in a com-
mon plan or scheme to eliminate price-competition between themselves, and to
"among other means-() By... !' A "dispassionate reader," capable of understanding
"a fairly exact use of English speech"--to use Air. Justice Holmes' words-must surely
have read these paragraphs as alleging "terms" of the single conspiracy charged in para-
graph 43, carried out by the various "means" described. Yet Judge Medina, trusting de-
fense counsel, read "means" to mean "terms," and then went on to treat each term as if it
stated a wholly independent "charge" or "offense." Defendants' opposition to competitive
bidding, for example, was not read as a "term" of the single restraint of trade conspiracy
"charged" in paragraph 43, but as a wholly separate "conspiracy" charge, to be disposed
of all by itself. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
24. Mir. Whitney appears to have misunderstood my initial article to say that para-
graph 44 consisted only in a statement of "means." See Whitney, p. 325. Actually, para-
graph 44A was spelled out as alleging a term of the conspiracy, that is, an agreement by
defendants "not to compete among themselves.' Steffen, p. 172. The many references
thereafter to 44A (1), 44A (2), and so on, were plainly references to those subparagraphs,
and, therefore, they were properly discussed as "means" only.
25. And, hence, the need for appellate courts.
26. Whitney, p. 326 (emphasis added). Failure on the part of the Government to
establish "uniform adherence" to each such practice, meant, in Mr. Whitney's view, that
"no case was left." There might be substantial agreement on the main terms of the con-
spiracy, as charged in paragraph 43, but that vms simply to be disregarded. The court
must find that no forest, i.e., conspiracy, existed, if, on making a microscopic e-mmination
of each individual tree, i.e., neans, he should find that there were differences, however
minor.
27. Mr. Whitney quotes a colloquy between himself and the court, to show that Mr.
Baldridge agreed with his position. Id. at 326 n.19. But this is another case of lifting
things out of context What was being discussed is made clear by Judge Medina's next
words, which Mr. Whitney failed to quote: "These are just part of what we call the mos aic
here, and he [Mr. Badridge] has been telling me, and I think with a great deal of justice,
that every one of these things by itself may seem inconsequential, but the aggregate of
them may not seem so. And I have to recognize that as being so." Transcript of Record,
p. 4901, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). It was not the
Government, therefore, but Mr. Whitney, who urged the up-side-down proposition-which
ultimately prevailed-that evidence of the defendant's various practices was introduced so
that the court might draw an "inference" that they-such practices-"had been agreed
upon."
195]
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channelize distribution. That was the conspiracy in restraint of trade and the
only such conspiracy charged in the complaint. 28
But, at some time during the openings, Judge Medina appears to have ac-
cepted the Whitney version.29 Indeed, he soon got "way out ahead" 0 of de-
fense counsel, for he disposed of the case in his opinion as if the "means"
stated in paragraph 44A (1)-(4) were themselves the offenses charged.,'
Moreover, and here even Mr. Whitney-quite properly-has nothing to say,
28. This was an action for equitable relieL It was enough, therefore, for the Govern-
ment to prove an agreement on only one of the basic "terms" of the charge. Mr. Justice
Douglas made this quite clear in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942) :
"We need not ... stop to explore all of the contentions made by the United States. They
include arguments that there has been an illegal division of markets ... ; that the 'agency'
agreements have been used to control unlawfully other materials sold in combination with
hardboard, the subject matter of Masonite's patents . . . ; that, in some instances, the
combination unlawfully controlled the price of hardboard 'owned' by the 'agents' . . . ; and
that the arrangement included agreements to, suppress the use of patents .... But we cal
put these contentions to one side without expressing an opinion on them. For there is one
phase of the case which is decisive. That is the agreement for price-fixing." (Emphasis
added.)
29. Judge Medina may have been persuaded to this position by his experience in the
Communist case. United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). There, in an
able charge to the jury, he said that, although the prosecution need not prove all of the
"means" set out in the indictment, it was necessary to establish "that one or more of the
means described in the indictment was agreed upon, to be used to effect the conspiracy."
Id. at 378 (emphasis added). But, of course, there is no requirement in antitrust law
that the defendants be shown to have committed or agreed upon any "overt act" or "means."
The point was settled long ago in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913), when
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Coming next to the objection that no overt act is laid, the
answer is that the Sherman Act punishes the conspiracies at which it is aimed on the
common law footing-that is to say, it does not make the doing of any act other than. the
act of conspiring a condition of liability." (Emphasis added.)
30. A phrase current at the trial.
31. A single illustration of the process must suffice. Some 1300 syndicate agreements,
issued at different times over a period of 30 years or more, were put in evidence under
paragraph 44A(1), to show that defendants did use the syndicate method as one "means"
by which they had conspired to eliminate price-competition and channelize distribution,
all as charged in paragraph 43. But the court-following carefully Mr. Whitney's teach-
ings-turned his back completely on paragraph 43, and then "spent many weeks" searching
the batch of agreements before him for "uniformity." When he discovered-what every-
one knew to start with-that there was "a conspicuous lack of uniformity" it; details, that
was the end of the matter. The slyly substituted "conspiracy" to "use" the "syndicate
system" (not the conspiracy charged) had blown up, i.e., "evaporated." United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621,683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
It is copy-book law that "uniformity" in the "means" used by the parties to a conspiracy
is never the question. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). The
essence of conspiracy lies in the "scheme" or plan, not in the means or elements which
"give to the scheme a body" and perhaps suffice "to accomplish it." Holmes, J., in Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). Defendants must be shown to have
given "their adherence to the scheme and participated in it," but in no other sense has
"uniformity" ever been a requirement. Stone, J., in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (emphasis added).
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the court disposed of each of these, one at a time, in piecemeal fashion, con-
trary to the most elementary rules in conspiracy cases.3 2 The result, surely,
was manifest error of law.
The "Revolttion"
Finally, according to Mr. Whitney, "Government counsel wholly failed to
appreciate, until confronted by statistical data at the trial, that a revolution has
occurred in investment banking . ". .. 3 Whatever may have been the "com-
petitive condition" of the industry "in the period 1934-1937,"3 4 and Mr.
Whitney concedes there may once have been "some sort of a code or ethic not
to compete," 35 it existed no longer, for "the business was revolutionized there-
after."3 6 "Yet, strangely enough," Mr. Whitney goes on to say, "the bulk of
the exhibits upon which the Government particularly relied came from the
period of 1934-1937."37
The plea, it will be noted, is one in confession and avoidance. But Mr.
Whitney seems to have overlooked the fact that the complaint was filed on
October 30, 1947. It is not strange at all, therefore, that most of the significant
documentary evidence in the case came from an earlier periodas 2%oreover,
contrary to Mr. Whitney's statement that the court was to be "primarily con-
cerned 3 9 with the period 1947-1949 in determining whether to enter a decree,
the exact opposite is true. In a rational world, the question whether a con-
spiracy existed on October 30, 1947, as charged, must necessarily be estab-
lished in the main by evidence from periods prior to that time.40
32. See Steffen, p. 187-88. Paragraph 44A(5), relating to defendants' use of resale
price agreements, penalties, and so on, was treated still differently. To the court it was
neither "means," "term" or "charge," but a superfluous allegation to be disposed of in a
"dictum." United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 6S6 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
33. Whitney, p. 339.
34. Id. at 342.
35. Id. at 339.
36. Id. at 342.
37. Ibid.
38. It would have been more than strange, in a realistic world, if much significant
evidence were to have found its way into the defendants' files while the pre-complaint
investigation was actually under way, or, for that matter, from the time when the Gov-
ernment filed its brief in the P.S.. case. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
19 S.E.C. 424 (1945). Moreover, as Charles E. Mitchell of Blyth & Co. testified, with
commendable frankness, it may have become less customary to write things out for the files:
Q. Three of the members of your Executive Committee are on the West Coast and
the balance are here on the East Coast? A. That is right.
Q. What means of communication do you use? A. Well, we used letter writing to a
greater degree for some years and used our own private-wire system. In later
years we have gotten wiser and use the telephone call."
Transcript of Record, p. 5823, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (emphasis added).
39. Whitney, p. 342.
40. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 11 F.R.D. 303 (D. Del.
1951) ; Note, 65 HAnv. L. Ray. 1079 (1952).
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It is a separate question whether a conspiracy-once established-is likely
to continue. Post-complaint evidence goes primarily to that issue.41 But, for
reasons not hard to see, it is a customary defense tactic, as in this case, for
counsel to seek to confuse the two. Perhaps the court can be persuaded, on
the basis of post-complaint evidence of good behavior, to hold that no con-
spiracy ever existed in the first place. Of course, post-complaint good be-
havior is sometimes not very hard to bring about. If the antitrust laws could
have been avoided by such means, they would long since have become a dead
letter. The Supreme Court, however, made it very clear quite early that a
court is not to be ousted of jurisdiction by evidence of a last minute conver-
sion.4
2
Mr. Whitney's supposed "revolution," moreover, leaves much to be desired.
It amounts to no more than some data, known to everyone, and in part intro-
duced by the Government, which show that "compulsory public sealed bid-
ding"43 has narrowed the field in which the defendant bankers can still
operate on a continuing-banker, private-negotiation basis, that is to say,
by the method of doing business challenged by the complaint. 44 But the
area is still very large, for it includes the whole field of industrial securities.
And, although "private placements" have made sizeable inroads upon this part
41. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd,
337 U.S. 293 (1949). Certain of the contracts there sought to be enjoined, far from having
been cancelled, were shown actually to have been renewed after the complaint was filed,
No better evidence of the continudng nature of the alleged violation could well have been
given.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 307 (1897),
where Mr. Justice Peckham said, in part, "we think the fact of the dissolution of the asso-
ciation does not prevent this court from taking cognizance of the appeal and deciding the
case upon its merits." Cf. United States v. W.T. Grant Co, 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
43. The SEC adopted Rule U-50, in 1941, to require competitive bidding for the
securities of registered public utility holding companies, and, in 1944 the ICC ordered
competitive bidding for railroad debt issues. Contrary to Mr. Whitney, this was quite well
known to Government counsel. In fact, the defendants' campaign in opposition to coin-
petitive bidding was alleged, in paragraph 44C of the complaint, as a "term" of the con-
spiracy in restraint of trade, charged in paragraph 43. The data introduced by the Gov-
ernment showed-without contradiction-that, while the defendants managed 73.24% of
all issues of $1,000,000 or over sold on a private negotiation basis, during the period 1935-
1949, they were able to manage only 55.66% of all issues of $1,000,000 or over sold at com-
petitive bidding during the period. Exhibit 111 (f), Transcript of Record, p. 7806, United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Exhibit III(c) showed that while
defendants had managed 92.78% of railroad issues sold on a negotiated basis, nondefendant
bankers were able to get 53.86% of the business done at competitive bidding during the
period. If this was a "revolution," it was one only in the sense that for the first time de-
fendants were required to sharpen their pencils and quote competitive prices, something
they did with only indifferent success.
44. See Steffen, p. 173. No objection was ever raised by the Government to use of
syndicates, as such. In fact, the more syndicates, the better, if that would mean real price-
competition, and a break-up of the "reciprocity," "historical position," and "interlocking
director" practices, common in the industry.
INVESTMENT BANKERS-REJOINDER
of defendants' domain, that surely is no "revolution." In fact, Mr. Whitney
makes it fairly clear in conclusion that no revolution at all has taken place in
any significant sense, but that the defendant bankers will continue their oper-
ations, much as in the past.48 And why not? Judge Medina's action in dismiss-
ing the case, "with prejudice," is a virtual license so to do.40
The conclusion is irresistible that it was not a "revolution" in the industry,
which caused the Government's case to "evaporate." The mischief was done
in the course of the openings, when, if I too may use Mr. Whitney's words,
the court was subjected to nearly four months of a sort of "brain washing"7
by defense counsel. A fairly simple case charging a conspiracy to eliminate
price-competition in the purchase and sale of securities was turned into a thing
of mystery and contradiction by much talk. Mr. Whitney alone talked, with
great skill and charm, for some sixteen court room days in succession,4 8 to say
nothing of his many interjections and comments at all other times. The
"revolution"-if any-was one in trial practice.
The case must necessarily have been reversed, if the Antitrust Division
had taken an appeal. As it is, however badly discredited, the decision will no
doubt be venerated for many years to come as the investment bankers' bible.
Surely, though, no trial court will soon again adopt Judge Medina's guiding
principle that, no matter how "minute and lacking in substance" their points
might be-and far too many were vulnerable on both counts 40-he would
45. Whitney, p. 343-44.
46. A counter-revolution, moreover, is well under way. On February 18 and March
31, 1954, several of defendant bankers or their counsel appeared in Washington, with
Judge Medina's opinion in hand, to urge that the SEC should now modify its Rule U-S0,
in order to exempt a large category of public utility securities from the present require-
ment of competitive bidding. Transcript of Proceedings, Oral Argument on Rule U-50, pp.
1, 170 (1954). The following defendant bankers were represented directly: Blyth & Co.,
Morgan Stanley & Co., Smith, Barney & Co., Lehman Brothers. The opposition came
from nondefendant bankers, joined by Robert R. Young and a few others.
47. Whitney, p. 321. Mr. Whitney implies that, without the "extended openings,"
the court would have been "bewildered and, from the defense point of view, subjected to
a sort of pro-plaintiff brain washing." That is surely an unfortunate way to describe the
orderly presentation of evidence even in a wholly documentary case, where, of course, the
court is presented with whatever is necessary to get accurately the plaintiff's version of
the case. (There is a proper time for the defendants to put in their case.) The openings
here, however, went round and round, with counsel for the seventeen defendants giving
their several versions of how the industry really operates, of what the complaint really
charged, and of what the Government's proposed exhibits really meant, all weeks and
months before any evidence at all had been presented. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Whit-
ney's statement that appeal on this ground was vraived by a remark of Government counsel
in the course of argument, Whitney, p. 320, the fact is that formal exception was taken on
the record. See Transcript of Record, p. 5584, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
48. Jan. 23, 1951 to Feb. 20, 1951, Transcript of Record, pp. 2182-3401, United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
49. No point of purported banking practice was so small-or so irrelevant-but that
hours might be spent in listening to the unsupported assertions of defense counsel giving
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"listen to the lawyers till the cows came home."' 0 Trial by colloquy must not
be allowed to supplant time honored notions of fair trial.
their versions of the matter, and much else. It is little wonder, therefore, that Judge
Medina lost track of the Government's basic charges. In fact, as the case wore along, he
necessarily began even to lose the line between evidence and mere assertion of counsel.
One example: Without any evidence whatever in the record he allowed himself to find
"that truckloads of documents were produced before the Grand Jury," something doubly
improper since Grand Jury proceedings are secret. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
50. MEDINA, JUDGE MEDINA SPRA s 54 (1954). Although Judge Medina goes on to
say that such a thing is impossible, "at least if you want to preserve your health," id. at
55, the extremely long record in the Bankers' case, unfortunately, bears witness on nearly
every page that he felt bound to make the sacrifice.
